

Reaching a State of Hope

Refugees, Immigrants and
the Swedish Welfare State, 1930–2000

Edited by
Mikael Byström & Pär Frohnert

Nordic
Academic
Press

NORDIC ACADEMIC PRESS



Nordic Academic Press
P.O. Box 1206
SE-221 05 Lund, Sweden
info@nordicacademicpress.com
www.nordicacademicpress.com

© Nordic Academic Press, Mikael Byström and Pär Frohnert 2013
Typesetting: Stilbildarna i Mölle, sbmolle.com
Cover design: Jacob Wiberg
Print: ScandBook, Falun 2013
ISBN 978-91-87351-23-5

Contents

Acknowledgements and general background	7
---	---

Mikael Byström & Pär Frohnert

I

PERSPECTIVES ON SWEDISH REFUGEE POLICY, 1933–45

Introduction I	29
----------------	----

Mikael Byström & Pär Frohnert

1. Sweden and the refugees, 1933–45	39
-------------------------------------	----

Klas Åmark

2. A foreign element within the nation	54
--	----

Karin Kvist Geverts

II

THE AGENTS OF REFUGEE POLICY AND RECEPTION, 1933–50

Introduction II	69
-----------------	----

Mikael Byström & Pär Frohnert

3. The politics of Jewish refugee aid and relief work in Sweden	80
---	----

Pontus Rudberg

4. Social-democratic solidarity	102
---------------------------------	-----

Pär Frohnert

5. The last bastion of Swedish refugee policy	116
---	-----

Mikael Byström

6. Raoul Wallenberg and Swedish humanitarian policy in Budapest	131
---	-----

Paul A. Levine

7. Swedish Jews and the Jewish survivors	145
--	-----

Malin Thor Tureby

III

REFUGEE POLICY IN THE SHADOW OF THE COLD WAR AND SWEDEN'S LABOUR SHORTAGE

Introduction III	167
------------------	-----

Mikael Byström & Pär Frohnert

8. From contract workers to political refugees	175
<i>Attila Lajos</i>	
9. Ethnic encounters, narratives, and counter-narratives	190
<i>Johan Svanberg</i>	
10. Controlling the untrustworthy	209
<i>Cecilia Notini Burch</i>	

IV

DISCOURSES AND PRACTICE, 1960–2000

Introduction IV	227
<i>Mikael Byström & Pär Frohnert</i>	
11. Union solidarity in exchange for adaptation	235
<i>Jesper Johansson</i>	
12. LO and refugee immigration, 1973–82	254
<i>Zeki Yalcin</i>	
13. Beyond Swedish self-image	270
<i>Christina Johansson</i>	

V

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND CONCLUSION

Introduction v	291
<i>Mikael Byström & Pär Frohnert</i>	
14. The agenda of British refugee policy, 1933–48	293
<i>Louise London</i>	
15. Pre-1945 refugee policy as a reference point for post-1945 policy	311
<i>Georg Kreis</i>	
16. Sweden's exceptional ability to organize its immigration	331
<i>Frank Caestecker</i>	
Abbreviations	366
About the authors	367

Acknowledgements and general background

Mikael Byström & Pär Frohnert

Acknowledgements

With great pleasure we approach the end of a long journey of writing and editing this anthology. We wish to thank all the contributors and, especially our international colleagues, for all their efforts, and their patience with us editors. This volume falls within the project ‘The refugees and the “People’s home”’, financed by the Swedish Research Council. We also want to express our gratitude to Dr Charlotte Merton who corrected our handling of the English language, and Annika Olsson, publishing manager at Nordic Academic Press, for an excellent collaboration and for pushing us forwards. We gratefully acknowledge that the costs for the publishing and the language proofreading have generously been covered by subsidies for internationalization from the former vice-chancellor of Stockholm University, as well as from the Department of History at the same university.

Sweden as a country of immigration

In 1930, Sweden was a small nation that had recently but successfully entered the industrial age. The trials of the Great Depression led to a political compromise in 1932 between the Social Democratic Party and the Farmers’ League that laid the ground for over forty years of social-democratic political hegemony. During the 1930s, the Social Democrats started the construction of the ‘People’s home’, a Swedish version of a welfare state intended to abolish ‘all social and economic barriers’, as was said in Parliament in 1928, and with extensive social security reforms; a model that bore great similarities to the Norwegian and Danish welfare states. The concept was successful, and soon achieved international fame thanks to publications such as Marquis Childs’s *Sweden: The Middle Way* of 1936. Through an adaptable policy of neutrality, Sweden then succeeded in staying outside the Second World War. When peace arrived, the country

had a huge economic advantage in the immediate post-war period, in contrast to the war-torn countries of the Continent. The whole period up to the mid-1970s was characterized by a strong economic growth, and particularly from the 1950s a rapid expansion of the country's welfare systems. The standard of living in Sweden was to be among the highest in the world.

Less well known from an international perspective is that Sweden after 1945 has been a country of immigration. Before 1945–6 there was exclusively refugee immigration; thereafter, and especially from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s, there was extensive labour immigration, mostly from the Nordic countries, but also from Southern Europe, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. After the economic recession in the 1970s, labour immigration was replaced by refugee and family reunification immigration, which has predominated from then on, remaining substantial despite increasing restrictions. The early 1990s in particular saw large groups of refugees arrive in Sweden, to a growing extent from non-European countries. In 1930, the foreign-born population of Sweden was very small; by end of the war it had grown due to political and war refugees; at the beginning of the 1970s, as labour immigration culminated, the proportion was substantial, since when it has continued to grow: in 2000 the proportion of the Swedish population that was foreign-born was 11.3 per cent.

Objectives

The main purpose of this anthology is to elucidate for an international audience the central aspects of Swedish immigration and immigrant history, both refugee and labour immigration, during the period 1930 to 2000. To our knowledge this has not been attempted before on this scale, and certainly not in this form. There is a wide-ranging article on Swedish immigration and immigration policy by the Swedish political scientist Tomas Hammar published in 1985 in his anthology *European Immigration Policy*, but the focus was on contemporary issues, albeit he gives a historical overview of developments in Sweden in the twentieth century.

All but four of the sixteen essays in the present anthology were written in connection with a conference in Stockholm in May 2010. The principal commentator at the conference, Dr Mario König, made a heroic contribution by critiquing all the papers presented on that occasion. König had been one of the historical research assistants and in 2001 the chief editor of the final report for the Bergier Commission (the Inde-

pendent Commission of Experts Switzerland—Second World War (ICE)) on Switzerland's actions during the Second World War in relation to Nazi Germany. Five of the contributions to the present anthology were also commented on after the conference by Louise London, author of the book *Whitehall and the Jews 1933–1948*, which has attracted much attention, and a contributor here of one of the two essays that treats other countries than Sweden in order to bring out the Swedish example in relief against the larger European picture; she treats the British policy towards the Jewish refugees in 1933–1948, while Georg Kreis discusses the link between the Swiss refugee policy after 1945 with that pursued in 1933–45. Kreis, a member of the Bergier Commission, has published extensively on Swiss immigration policy, and was a keynote speaker at the Stockholm conference.

The concluding essay by Frank Caestecker brings out the characteristics of Swedish immigration and immigrant policies in relation to European developments at large. Caestecker is particularly suited for the task as in 2010 he was co-author and co-editor with Bob Moore of *Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Liberal European States*, a book that deals with the international refugee regime and includes non-European surveys in addition to the refugee policies and reception in Germany's liberal neighbour states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Demographic development

In 1930 Sweden had a population of slightly over 6 million. The majority were Lutheran by dint of their membership of the Established Church, and demonstrated a high degree of homogeneity, while such minorities as existed were few and small, the largest group being the Sami, the Finnish-speakers in the northernmost part of Sweden (neither group numbering more than 25,000), the Jews (some few thousands), and a small group of Roma. Until around 1910, Swedish emigration had been very large, mainly to the US, while in the period 1821–1930 1.2 million Swedes left the country, the equivalent of 20 per cent of the country's population in 1900. Thus, fresh in their memories was a national self-image of a country that was losing young people who chose to leave home for a better life overseas.

In 1930, only 1 per cent of the population was foreign-born (a figure that also included re-immigrating Swedes), which it must be said was a very low figure in a European perspective. Half of them came from

the neighbouring countries of Finland, Norway, and Denmark, the rest mainly from Germany, Russia, Poland, and the three small Baltic states. From the East European countries, Jews constituted an important element. To a small extent, Sweden had received refugees from the Russian Revolution and the Finnish Civil War in 1918, but before 1930 Swedish experience of refugee immigration was very limited.

During the 1930s, the birth rate in Sweden was very low, a source of great concern in the public debate, not least in Alva and Gunnar Myrdal's book *Kris i befolkningsfrågan* ('Crisis in the population question', 1934). The looming labour shortage was seldom linked to immigration as a possible solution, let alone from the very countries from where political refugees and Jews were seeking refuge. During the war, however, the birth rate quickly rose and resulted in a baby boom, if a short-lived one. Sweden then had a very low birth rate in the 1960s and 1970s: in 1970 the population reached 8 million, and in 2000 not quite 9 million.

Foreign influences and attitudes to foreigners

Ever since the 1880s, Swedish culture, not least in the arts and sciences, had been strongly influenced by German culture. German, for example, was the standard second language in schools until shortly after the Second World War, when it was replaced by English. In the 1930s, Sweden's cultural and personal contacts with Germany remained close, yet even before the First World War a cultural switch had begun with a greater openness to Anglo-Saxon influences. Probably the close personal connections to the US through emigration and substantial re-immigration to Sweden had an impact. The Nazi regime of terror discredited German culture for a very long time. After the war, American influences in science and culture—not least popular culture—broke through on a wide front, and have dominated ever since.

For an international audience it has often been stressed that Sweden in 1922 was the first country in the world to have an institute of racial biology financed by the state; however, the activities of the institute did not resonate in Sweden, and when the central figure retired and a new director was appointed in 1935 the focus of the institute changed to genetics. Racial biology is also sometimes linked to Sweden's mass sterilization. There was a large element of coercion in the sterilization programmes (which all targeted women and ran into the 1970s), but the element of race biology was actually very limited. Those specifically singled out were young women who were thought to have behaved improperly, the mentally retarded, and

the mentally ill, but the absolute majority were women with numerous children and who themselves applied for a sterilization.

The nature of the 'Swedish' mentality towards foreigners and immigrants at different points in the twentieth century is both difficult to capture and debate in historical research. During the interwar period, Sweden was characterized by a widespread suspicion of 'strangers'—especially Jews—that sometimes tipped over into xenophobia. The reasons why probably include the homogeneity of the population, the insignificant experience of people from other countries, and dominant contemporaneous beliefs about different 'races' or 'peoples' where Scandinavians invariably saw themselves as having a high standing in the hierarchy. A growing and widespread nationalism during both the interwar period and the war itself was actively supported by the dominant Social Democratic Party. There is now considerable debate as to how important an element antisemitism was in the run-up to the Second World War. It seems clear that antisemitic beliefs, including open hostility, were widespread among some groups of the population, mostly the bourgeoisie, and to a certain degree the working class and the labour movement; however, Swedish reactions to the rising antisemitism in Nazi Germany were usually negative, above all when the persecution of the Jews took more and more brutal and open forms. It was the violence against the Jews that Swedish public opinion reacted against.

When the Swedes for the first time encountered political refugees and Jews, who began to arrive in very limited numbers in 1933 and met with a very restrictive refugee policy, the refugee question began to feature on the public and political agenda. The impression given by the reactions is somewhat contradictory for the 1930s and 1940s. Important sections of the press, particularly the non-socialist press, were critical of refugee immigration, and there was a clear element of xenophobia in their arguments—above all, a dread of Jews and communists. Yet at the same time, a positive view of the refugees was evident in parts of the press and to some extent at public meetings—a line strongly supported by the Left (both within and outside the Social Democratic Party), the Communists, and to some extent the Liberals. Anti-refugee sentiment does not seem to have been such that refugees who arrived in Sweden during the 1930s, and then in far greater numbers during the Second World War, generally encountered xenophobic and racist attitudes. The picture was a complex one.

With the large numbers of refugees who fled to Sweden during the last years of the war and the dawn of labour immigration after the war,

Swedes had far greater experience of meeting people from other countries and cultures. The fact that as many as half of the immigrants long came from neighbouring Nordic countries of course meant that the perceived cultural difference was small. Not until the 1960s was there much public debate about how immigrants should be treated in Sweden; until then it was seen as self-evident that they should be assimilated into Swedish society. The fact that the absolute majority of immigrants had arrived to Sweden as individuals meant they were usually anxious to adapt to Swedish conditions quickly, even if the different ethnic immigrant groups to some extent maintained mutual contacts with their own associations and similar activities. Immigrants did meet with mistrust from the Swedish population, but one can hardly speak of extensive xenophobia as long as labour immigration dominated. The universal welfare state model also meant that immigrants were encompassed by the same rights as Swedish citizens. A guest-worker policy like that seen in Germany was not developed. The assimilation standpoint began to be replaced by an integrationist approach, seen in policy from around 1970. The development of Sweden's immigrant policy and public opinion from the 1960s onwards is dealt with in more detail below.

Economic developments

Sweden fared somewhat better in the Great Depression than did comparable countries, and retained that stronger economic development with rapid industrialization until 1950. These favourable structural conditions were reinforced by the government's neutrality policy, which kept the country out of the war, and the foundations of the Swedish labour market model, which were laid in the 1930s. The Swedish Employers' Association (*Svenska arbetsgivarförbundet*) and the blue-collar Trade Union Confederation (*Landsorganisationen*, or LO), the two main actors in the labour market, agreed upon a set of rules that predicated peaceful negotiations, which kept the state outside the agreements of the labour market and gave the trade unions considerable influence. In return, the trades unions, whose power reflected the very high degree of unionization in Sweden, were positive to structural rationalizations. After the war, the white-collar unions (which were separate from LO) came to the fore, they too thanks to the strongly unionized workforce. Traditionally, the links between LO and the Social Democratic Party were very strong, a relationship that has remained close and constitutes an important element in the Swedish model in a broader sense.

Instead of a feared post-war recession, strong economic growth started

immediately after the war, in Sweden as elsewhere. The period from 1950 to 1975 was the golden age of industrialism in Sweden—the 1960s being ‘the record years’—with an uninterrupted economic yearly growth of several per cent. Unemployment was low at only a few per cent, and by the mid-1970s Swedish living standards were among the highest in the world. Growth gave scope for a rapid expansion of public service provision, mostly in the form of education, health care, and, at the end of the period, childcare. A very large group of women who had been housewives established themselves in the labour market due to the enlargement of the public sector. There was a need for immigrant labour, mostly in industry and health care, which was something the unions were usually positive towards. Processing levels rose in Swedish industry, and the engineering sector, especially the car industry, became more important. The country’s considerable export dependence grew even more. Sweden supported international free trade, but the markets for both labour and capital were regulated within national borders.

The worldwide oil crisis of 1973–4 was accompanied in Sweden by an extensive structural crisis stretching over many years, where hitherto successful industrial sectors soon turned out to be uncompetitive in a more and more globalized economy—textiles, steel, and ships could all be produced more cheaply in other countries. In the decades after the oil crisis, the previous recipe for success with its large dollop of state control proved itself inadequate to the new challenges. Sweden saw weaker economic development than comparable countries in the period 1975–95 and slid down the living standards league table. Unemployment was double that of the previous period. Governing politicians were forced to abandon their tried-and-tested economic policies, and among other things the capital markets were liberalized. Sweden experienced a new, deep financial crisis in the early 1990s with rising unemployment; however, the government managed to pick its way through slightly more successfully this time. In 1995, Sweden joined the European Union, taking it into a new phase of political development.

Political developments

Sweden was led by social-democrat governments for almost the entire period from 1932 to 1976, reflecting a very stable political landscape that had been established in the 1920s and endured into the 1980s. The political spectrum was covered from Right to Left by five parties: the Conservatives (Högerpartiet, later Moderata Samlingspartiet); the

Farmers' League (Bondeförbundet), later from 1957 the Centre Party (Centerpartiet); the Liberals (Folkpartiet); the Social Democratic Party; and the Communists (loyal to Moscow until the 1960s). Inspired by Nazi Germany, two small Nazi parties were started in Sweden in the 1930s, but they did not obtain more than 1.6 per cent of the vote in the general election of 1936 (their best result). For shortish periods in the 1930s and the 1950s the Social Democrats governed in coalition with the Farmers' League, and during the war there was a broad coalition government that included all the parliamentary parties except the Communists. During the 1930s, the construction of the 'People's Home' had started, but was interrupted by the outbreak of war.

The construction of the welfare state—the 'People's Home'—in the 1950s and 1960s was generally supported by all parties in Parliament, with the weakest interest from the Conservatives. The political disagreements turned on the design of the reforms, mostly the questions of the reach of the public sphere (the idea of security for the individual) and the place of the family and the individual (the idea of freedom), universalism, and 'standard security'—income-based social security. The reforms as such were usually conceived of as evidence of Sweden's progress and modernity. With voter support running at around 45 per cent for a period of nearly forty years (1936–85), sometimes even over 50 per cent, the Social Democrats were able to pursue the reforms, which, however, in their concrete form were the result of political conflicts and compromise. The social reforms and the expansion of public services were financed by higher taxes; Sweden became a high-tax country. The most important support for the Social Democrats came from the Farmers' League/Centre Party, keen to defend the interests of its rural constituency, and from the Liberals, who pursued a social liberal policy. LO, with its close links to the Social Democrats, was able to exercise considerable influence on policy.

The long period of Social Democratic rule was broken in the general election of 1976 in the wake of a deep social crisis. The new political winds blew a non-socialist, three-party government to power. The period up to 1994 was characterized by weaker economic growth and political instability, with nine years of non-socialist government succeeded by nine years of Social Democratic government in 1982–91. During the 1970s the environment, and particularly nuclear power, became an important political issue, and in 1988 the Green Party (Miljöpartiet) entered Parliament for the first time. The 1980s and early 1990s were characterized by a growing state deficit, deregulation, and cuts to the welfare system.

The political upheavals on the world stage in 1989–91 came as a huge

surprise to the Swedish politicians—as for so many others—and profoundly changed the external conditions for Sweden’s foreign policy. As an effect of the growing, and feared, flows of refugees—mostly from the disintegrating Yugoslavia and from Somalia—refugee issues became a hot political topic, and in 1991 a right-wing, populist, anti-immigration party, New Democracy (Ny demokrati) managed to enter Parliament; however, the party collapsed after a few years. A new non-socialist minority governed for the three years to 1994, coinciding with a Swedish bank crisis, currency speculation, and an application for membership of the European Union. This was followed by twelve years of Social Democratic minority governments, periodically with weak voter support, which successfully pursued an economic programme of savings and reforms to tackle the growing national debt and banking sector problems.

Swedish foreign policy

The foreign policy was to a large extent determined by Sweden’s neutrality, which it had declared at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Starting in around 1930, Swedish defence was largely dismantled, and the country was militarily weak in 1939. Rearmament, when it came, was rapid. At the outbreak of the Second World War, Sweden again declared itself neutral. During the first years it zigzagged under German pressure to accommodate its demands, especially for coal, but after the turn of the war the demands the government paid greatest heed to came instead from the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Thereafter, a defence force of some size—and particularly a very large, modern air force—was maintained for a number of decades.

When Sweden at the end of the 1940s failed to create a Scandinavian neutral defence organization, Norway and Denmark choosing to join the NATO instead, it continued its neutral foreign policy during the cold war under the slogan of ‘non-alignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in war’. There was a broad political consensus on foreign and defence policy, but the Social Democratic governments kept a firm grip on how the neutrality policy should be interpreted. It was generally recognized, however, that Sweden was oriented towards the West, and in practice a succession of Swedish governments maintained a secret and very important military cooperation with the West. The effect of its neutrality in the face of the cold-war blocs was also to put Sweden outside the European integration efforts. In general, political interest in Sweden’s Continental neighbours was limited, although there was some attention paid to Nordic issues.

From the foundation of the UN, Sweden was an eager promoter of international cooperation and conflict management. Starting in the 1960s, Sweden became something of a force to be reckoned with among the world's non-aligned states as it navigated a third course between the two superpowers. Not least this provided an opening towards the Third World.

With the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war in 1989–91, new external conditions were created for Sweden's foreign policy, and by 1991 it had already applied for membership of the European Union. Sweden became a member of the EU in 1995.

Swedish refugee, immigration, and immigrant policies

Swedish historical research on immigration has been quite limited; it has been a field of far greater interest to sociologists, ethnologists, political scientists, and, to some extent, economic historians (a separate academic discipline in Sweden). The specific state of the literature on the various topics considered here is dealt with in the introductions to the four first parts of the present volume.

From 1860, the free movement of people was the guiding principle in Sweden as in the rest of Western and Central Europe, with all, natives and foreigners, allowed freely to travel into the country and live and work there. Only for trade were there special rules. Foreign citizens who lived in Sweden had no right to vote, and there were rules about special grounds for extradition, including crime and begging. At the end of the nineteenth century, when citizenship increasingly became a precondition for the individual's rights and obligations in the industrialized nation-states—a link that became stronger with the social reform programmes that were introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century—concepts such as 'alien' and 'refugee' became more important. With the new patterns of employment that came with industrialization, migration took on a new character, as people started to search for a livelihood and security in other countries. Further movements were created when people sought refuge from the many political, national, social, and ethnic conflicts across Europe.

Before 1914, the very fragmentary, limited Swedish legislation on foreign nationals mainly focused on keeping foreign so-called vagrants away. Even if the idea of the freedom of movement formally was maintained, the policy gradually came to be founded on temporary proclamations. The purpose of the proclamations was obvious: immigration should be limited, even if it was very marginal, and control over foreigners in Swe-

den should increase. In 1914 further rules concerning expulsion were issued, the same year that Roma were forbidden to enter the country. Faced with the upheavals of the First World War, in 1917–18 passports and visas were made obligatory for most foreign citizens.

The Aliens Act of 1927, Sweden's first proper legislation on aliens, mainly meant that the administrative practice that had already evolved was now regulated in law. In other respects there were few comprehensive changes. The legislation underlined the issue of employment, with Swedish labour to be protected from foreign competition. Another issue was the value accorded to the fact that 'our country's population is of an unusually uniform, unblended race'. However, passport and visa requirements were gradually eased for Nordic citizens and West and Central European travellers.

In the 1930s, as we have seen, experience of immigrants was very limited in Sweden. What was frequently discussed, both in Sweden and internationally, however, was 'the European refugee problem'. In the nineteenth century there had been an idea that people who had committed 'political crimes' and ran the risk of being punished in their home countries should be granted asylum. Any closer definition did not exist in the Swedish legislation. The first formalized refugee definitions were stipulated internationally in the 1920s, and it was largely thanks to the League of Nations that the concept of the 'political refugee' was introduced. When Sweden revised its Aliens Act in 1937, one of its main concerns was to strengthen the protection afforded political refugees. In drafting the revisions, the official report stressed that Jewish refugees should not be counted as political refugees: 'Still less could they, who have left their home country because of their race, or else limitations on their livelihoods, or sensing dislike, be considered to be political refugees.' The exclusion of the Jews, which was further increased in September and October 1938 through changes to administrative procedures, turned out to have severe consequences for the thousands seeking protection from Nazi German persecution who were denied entry permits or were turned back at the border.

In practice, Sweden's refugee policy was restrictive in the extreme, and the fear of above all Jewish refugees was evident. Unfortunately, Sweden in this respect was no exception. Almost all European states closed their borders in order to escape having to accept Jewish refugees. It should be added that Sweden was especially restrictive about binding itself to any obligations in international agreements on refugees. At the same time, it must be underlined that during the 1930s and 1940s one element in

Swedish public opinion was largely positive towards refugees—something that rarely features in histories of the period. Voluntary refugee committees, organizations, and private individuals made huge practical efforts, and there were several public figures and politicians who expressed their support for the refugees.

In spite of the still fluid definition of a political refugee, blank refusal of entry at the border was precluded under the Aliens Act of 1937: anyone who claimed to be a political refugee had the right to have his or her case examined. Yet it proved crucial for the coming years that the virtually unlimited power of government in the question of aliens and refugees remained, because in the case of war, threat of war, or ‘due to special circumstances’ the government could issue such regulations as it found necessary. This made for considerable arbitrariness. The 1937 Act was intended to be valid for five years, but was prolonged due to the war, and remained in force until 1945 with small modifications.

At the outbreak of the Second World War there were no more than 5,000 refugees or so in Sweden, a manifest result of its restrictive policy. This state of affairs continued until the autumn of 1942, when Nazi Germany’s grip tightened in Norway, and thousands of Norwegians fled to Sweden. From that point on the stream of refugees increased gradually, and in the literature there is talk of a ‘refugee policy changeover’ from a restrictive to a more generous policy. In the closing stages of the war there were approximately 195,000 foreign citizens in Sweden, for the most part refugees (primarily Norwegians, Danes, and Estonians) and evacuees from Finland. Besides, during the spring and summer of 1945 Sweden received approximately 30,000 concentration-camp survivors from the Continent, many arriving with the so-called White Buses under the aegis of the Swedish Red Cross. These people were officially termed ‘repatriates’, which was a signal that they were expected to return to their home countries; many, however, remained in Sweden. Thus there was undeniably some sort of change if we compare the number of refugees before and after the war, but possible explanations for it are discussed in the introduction to Part 1 of this book, which questions whether there was a changeover as such, given that Sweden’s restrictive refugee policy instead showed considerable continuity over time.

In 1945 a new Aliens Act was passed that was followed up with smaller revisions in subsequent years. No major changes were made, and the situation can be described as expectant. It was a new, confusing time: millions of people on the Continent were living as refugees or so-called displaced persons, and the cold war almost immediately cast its pall over European

politics, adding to the uncertainty about the future direction of policies on aliens. The refugee issue took on an international character when the UN began to discuss it, something that of course had consequences for national legislation on aliens.

Following the end of the war, most refugees in Sweden returned to their native countries. Certain refugee issues stirred up public opinion, as in the huge outcry at the 'expulsion of the Balts' (in fact German soldiers and Balts who had been in German uniforms) to the Soviet Union. Those who remained in Sweden were primarily the Baltic refugees and non-Nordic former concentration-camp internees. Sweden's increasingly negative attitude towards the Soviet Union after 1948 and its interest in acquiring the Western powers' 'good will' meant that there were no refusals of entry or expulsions to the Soviet Union, although there were to other Eastern bloc states whose nationals were found not to be refugees. As the backwash of the war ebbed away, few refugees made their way to north. Until the 1970s, almost all refugees came from the communist bloc; between 1950 and 1967, they numbered only 24,000, of whom 7,000 were refugees from the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Instead, it was family reunification, and particularly labour immigration, that made up the new categories of foreign citizens in Sweden.

The next round of legislation, the Aliens Act of 1954, bore clear traces of adjustments to reflect the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 (ratified by Sweden in 1954) and had a totally different character than its predecessors. For example, it was now said that, wherever possible, foreigners should be given the same benefits as Swedish citizens. The law also spoke of the 'rights' of refugees, meaning that refugees could not be denied asylum unless specific circumstances told against it. For these reasons, it could be said that this was Sweden's first modern alien legislation, in the sense that it observed international law, humanitarian responsibility, and human rights. The Act remained in force with several adjustments until 1980, when it was replaced by a law that imposed new regulations about surveillance and limitations on foreign citizens in the wake of recent terrorist attacks.

An unexpected economic boom followed the Second World War. In Sweden, this brought a substantial shortage of labour, which revealed the full scope of the contribution the war refugees had made, not least in forestry and agriculture. As early as the summer and autumn of 1945 there were moves to 'import' Nordic labour. During the first years recruitment was mainly collective, with the Swedish labour market authorities coming to various agreements with their Nordic partners. An agreement

from 1954 formally established a common Nordic labour market, but in practice the Swedish labour market had already been open to Nordic citizens since the end of the war. These labour migrants and their families, and particularly the Finns, made up by far the largest groups of immigrants until the 1960s.

From the end of the 1940s, workers were also 'imported' from elsewhere in Europe such as Hungary, Italy, and Austria (in the latter case mainly Sudeten German refugees). By and large this followed the pattern established with the Nordic countries: the respective employment authorities came to an agreement and the Swedish agents decided who should be found work. Initially there was an element of coercion in all this, but as the need for foreign labour grew so conditions eased, and, besides, more immigrants came to Sweden independent of the collective recruitment drives. Sweden established centres for information on immigration possibilities in several countries; these had a large impact on the immigration patterns. From the beginning of the 1950s to the end of the 1960s one can even speak of free immigration to Sweden. It was possible to come to Sweden as a tourist and then apply for a work permit. Every hand was needed and the majority of applications were granted. All applications for prolongations of work permits were also granted. And the numbers of immigrants were large. In the space of two decades, there were a net total of 370,000 immigrants.

Until the war, the Swedish state had taken only very limited responsibility for the support of refugees and immigrants. Aid was expected to be provided by voluntary committees, relatives, or friends. Beginning in 1939, however, the state was obliged to take an ever larger economic responsibility, and this was established in the Aliens Act of 1954, in which the state guaranteed refugees and immigrants the same rights as Swedish citizens—reflecting a broad political consensus. Whether this was an expression of genuine solidarity or whether it was primarily to ensure that working conditions for Swedish workers did not become worse as a result of the import of cheaper labour, the influential trade union movement was an important force behind this development.

After changes in practice led to a more or less free labour immigration in the early 1960s, and the number of immigrants (including their families), mainly from Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, rose quickly, during a recession with unemployment, the rules for non-Nordic labour immigrants were tightened up in 1967 after initiatives from both LO and the National Labour Market Board with the demand that a job, work permits, and housing should already be lined up before entry to Sweden. The new rules

heralded further restrictions at the beginning of the 1970s. Labour immigration culminated in 1970 with a net immigration of 78,000 people. One of the reasons for the new rules was that the shortage of labour subsided in the aftermath of the economic crisis of the 1970s at the same time as immigration rose. In 1975 the proportion of foreign-born residents was 6.7 per cent. However, fluctuations in the policy towards immigrants (and refugees) cannot only be explained in terms of economic or labour market policy. Nordic immigration diminished during the 1960s and was replaced by immigration from Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece (non-European immigration was non-existent before the 1970s). The new immigrant groups were regarded as being more distant from the 'Swedish culture' than earlier (primarily Nordic) immigrants had been and this points to the importance of ethnic factors for the formulation of the policy. Similar ethnic patterns were evident in the passport and visa rules of the 1920s, in the post-war refugee policy, and in the ethnically coloured refugee and immigration policies of the 1970s and the 2000s.

The official Immigrants Report, initiated in 1968 and completed in 1974, was called for by the changed situation. The report in a way was a child of its time—the protests of 1968. The world had widened, and solidarity and equality were words to take seriously. That immigrants should have the same rights as Swedish citizens was self-evident; integration was something desirable. Until this time it had been just as self-evident that refugees and immigrants should be assimilated—that they should abandon their own culture, and original cultural differences should be erased. The responsibility for this adjustment had been placed on the individual immigrants or refugees. At the end of the 1960s this policy came to an end. Instead it was established that the state and society must facilitate and support the integration of immigrants and refugees into Swedish society. In 1975, new principles of multiculturalism in policy on immigrants were established, the watchwords of which were 'equality' of opportunity for immigrants, 'freedom of choice' for foreigners to choose their own identity, and 'cooperation' between the immigrants and the majority population. An important aspect was language skills: in 1972, a new law stated that the employers had to pay for Swedish language classes for their employees, and in 1976 the children of immigrants were offered school courses in their own 'home' languages. In 1976 this new integration policy led to immigrants being allowed to vote for the first time in local and regional elections. Sweden became the first country in the world to give immigrants voting rights. Tomas Hammar (1990) has established the concept of 'denizen' to signify the growing catego-

ry of people in Western nations who ‘are foreign citizens with a legal and permanent resident status’. This group was clearly to be discerned in Sweden during the 1960s, and with the local franchise—for people who had lived three years in the country—these denizens also acquired all political rights except the right to vote in general elections. It was relatively easy to obtain Swedish citizenship, but in fact few took the opportunity (approximately 5 per cent in the 1980s) and most chose to keep their original citizenship. But at the same time as the first steps were being taken towards an inclusive policy on immigrants, the official report outlined a hardened immigration policy: changes to the law in the 1970s would further diminish the possibilities for people outside the Nordic countries to seek a new life in Sweden. However, refugee policy remained liberal for another decade.

Several changes were made to the immigration legislation in subsequent decades, mostly in a restrictive direction, even though developments were ambiguous at times. Thus the practice established in the late 1960s that military deserters and *de facto* refugees could be granted asylum was written into the law of 1975. In 1980, limitations on foreign citizens’ rights were introduced against the background of terrorist threats. In one and the same law in 1989, the reasons for not granting asylum were extended (by adopting the principle of the first country of asylum), but humanitarian reasons could be given for asylum (as was already the practice). The so-called Lucia Decision of December 1989 limited ‘refugee reasons’ to Convention refugees, which drastically reduced the number given asylum. (However, the decision was annulled in 1991.) In the 1990s, the government tested using visa requirements for various countries and periods, as well as temporary residence permits; however, in practice, asylum was granted to tens of thousands of refugees, mainly from Bosnia, in 1993–4. Wholly new rules were promulgated in 1997. Convention refugees of course remained (as regulated in international agreements), *de facto* refugees and military deserters were removed from the list of those eligible for asylum, and instead a new ‘in need of protection’ category was established, for (i) persons who were threatened by capital punishment, corporal punishment, or torture; (ii) military deserters, or persons fleeing an ongoing war; and (iii) reasons of sexual orientation or gender identity (homosexuality). Humanitarian reasons remained grounds for asylum.

Disposition

We have begun by looking at Swedish conditions in general and Swedish refugee and immigration policy in particular. To guide the reader with an interest in migration issues but with a limited knowledge of Sweden and Swedish migration policy, we have taken a chronological approach in this anthology, but divided it according to five distinct themes. Each theme begins with a short introduction to the theme and the period.

Part I, 'Perspectives on Swedish refugee policy, 1933–45', considers general Swedish refugee policy in the 1930s and 1940s. The introduction looks at the principle arguments presented in the literature on Sweden and the Second World War in general, and Swedish refugee policy in particular. Klas Åmark and Karin Kvist Geverts discuss the development of Sweden's refugee policy in the period in their two essays.

Part II, 'The agents of refugee policy and reception, 1933–50', deals with those responsible for refugee policy, again in the 1930s and 1940s. The introduction details the remit of the national authorities responsible for Sweden's refugee policy at the time, and the non-governmental organizations or NGOs such as voluntary refugee aid committees on which Swedish refugee policy was so reliant. Pär Frohnert and Pontus Rudberg in their essays treat two very different refugee committees, the influential Labour Movement's Refugee Relief and the Jewish community in Stockholm. Mikael Byström focuses on one part of the state's involvement: the National Refugee Board. Paul Levine's essay addresses one of the best-known individuals involved, Raoul Wallenberg. The last of the essays in this part by Malin Thor Tureby is a study of the Swedish Jewish public discourse on Holocaust survivors immediately after the war, here represented by articles in two Swedish-Jewish periodicals.

Part III, 'Immigration policy in the shadow of the cold war and Sweden's labour shortage', treats the early years of the Swedish labour imports at the beginning of the cold war, and their effects on refugee policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s. By way of introduction, we outline developments in the Swedish economy in the early post-war years, the labour market, Sweden's labour shortage, and the influence of the authorities on quotas of immigrant workers and their conditions, while the advent of the cold war and the security policy perspective on refugees are also sketched. Attila Lajos in his essay examines how one of the first groups—Hungarian citizens who were brought to Sweden in order to work in agriculture—was recruited, how the 'import' was organized, and the conditions that met the workers once in Sweden. Johan Svanberg's essay looks at the meet-

ing between refugees as part of the workforce and the powerful Swedish trade union movement. Cecilia Notini Burch concludes this part with an essay on refugee policy in the security policy perspective that evolved at the start of the cold war.

Part IV, 'Discourses and practice, 1960–2000', has two distinct foci over a broad time span. In the introduction, we describe the general circumstances—that from 1954 to the late 1960s it is possible to speak of free immigration to Sweden, the subsequent tightening of the rules, and the dwindling possibilities until the 1990s—sketched using the various changes to the legislation, to labour market requirements, and to the discourse of refugees and immigrants. The relationship between the trade union movement and immigration policy is analysed by Jesper Johansson and Zeki Yalcin, each with their own very different perspectives. The relation between state, nation, and immigration policy on the political level is discussed by Christina Johansson.

Part V, 'International perspectives and conclusion', brings international perspectives to bear. We introduce three contributions with a non-Swedish perspective by summarizing where Swedish research stands in relation to international migration research and the attention paid to Swedish refugee and migration research in international studies. Louise London's essay treats refugee policies and antisemitism in the UK in 1930–50, building on her dissertation. Georg Kreis gives a picture of how Switzerland's wartime refugee policy has since been perceived, and how these conceptions have influenced later refugee policy. The anthology concludes with Frank Caestecker's bird's eye view of the topic as a whole, reflecting on both Swedish and European refugee and immigration research.

References

- Almgren, Birgitta, *Drömmen om Norden. Nazistisk infiltration i Sverige 1933–45*, Stockholm 2005.
- Åmark, Klas, *Hundra år av välfärdspolitik: Välfärdsstatens framväxt i Norge och Sverige*, Umeå 2005.
- *Att bo granne med ondskan. Sveriges förhållande till nazismen, Nazityskland och Förintelsen*, Stockholm 2011.
- Andersson, Jenny & Östberg, Kjell, 'Vi och alla andra', in Östberg & Andersson 2013.
- Andersson, Lars M., *En jude är en jude är en jude...: representationer av 'juden' i svensk skämtpress omkring 1900–1930*, Lund 2000.
- Bachner, Henrik, *'Judefrågan'. Debatt om antisemitism i 1930-talets Sverige*, Stockholm 2009.
- Berge, Anders, *Flyktingpolitik i stormakts skugga. Sverige och de sovjetryska flyktingarna under andra världskriget*, Uppsala 1992.
- Boguslaw, Julia, *Svensk invandringspolitik under 500 år, 1512–2012*, Lund 2012.

- Broberg, Gunnar & Roll-Hansen, Nils (eds.), *Eugenics and the welfare state. Sterilization policy in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland*, East Lansing 2005.
- Byström, Mikael, *En broder, gäst och parasit. Uppfattningar och föreställningar om utlänningar, flyktingar och flyktingpolitik i svensk offentlig debatt 1942–1947*, Stockholm 2006.
- 'Från fattigt utvandrarnland till rikt invandrarnland', in Hirdman, Lundberg & Björkman 2012.
- *Utmaningen. Den svenska välfärdsstatens möte med flyktingar i andra världskrigets tid*, Lund 2012.
- Caestecker, Frank & Moore, Bob (eds.), *Refugees from Nazi Germany and the liberal European States*, New York 2010.
- Carlsson, Carl Henrik, 'Judisk invandring från Aaron Isaac till idag', in Helmut Müssener (ed.), *Judarna i Sverige—en minoritets historia*, Uppsala 2011.
- Ekholm, Curt, *Balt- och tyskutlämningen 1945–1946*, 2 vols., Uppsala 1984.
- Ekman, Stig & Åmark, Klas, *Sweden's relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust: a survey of research*, Stockholm 2003.
- Gerner, Kristian, 'Sverige i världen, världen i Sverige', in Östberg & Andersson 2013.
- Hallberg, Lars, *Källor till invandringens historia i statliga myndigheters arkiv 1840–1990*, Stockholm 2001.
- Hammar, Tomas, *Sverige åt svenskarna. Invandringspolitik, utlänningskontroll och asylrätt 1900–1932*, Stockholm 1964.
- 'Sweden', in id. (ed.), *European immigration policy. A comparative study*, Cambridge 1985.
- *Democracy and the nation state. Aliens, denizens and citizens in a world of international migration*, Aldershot 1990.
- 'The integration or non-integration of refugee immigrants. Historical experiences in Sweden', in Göran Rystad (ed.), *The uprooted. Forced migration as an international problem in the post-war era*, Lund 1990.
- 'Closing the doors to the Swedish welfare state', in Grete Brochmann & Tomas Hammar (eds.), *Mechanisms of immigration control. A comparative analysis of European regulation policies*, Oxford 1999.
- Hirdman, Yvonne, Lundberg, Urban & Björkman, Jenny, *Sveriges historia 1920–1965*, Stockholm 2012.
- ICE, *Final report of the Independent Commission of Experts. Switzerland—Second World War*, 2002, available at <www.uek.ch/en/>, accessed 27 April 2013.
- Johansson, Christina, *Välkomna till Sverige? Svenska migrationspolitiska diskurser under 1900-talets andra hälft*, Malmö 2005.
- Johansson, Jesper, 'Så gör vi inte här i Sverige. Vi brukar göra så här.' *Retorik och praktik i LO:s invandrarpolitik 1945–1981*, Växjö 2008.
- Kvist Geverts, Karin, *Ett främmande element i nationen. Svensk flyktingpolitik och de judiska flyktingarna 1938–1944*, Uppsala 2008.
- Lindberg, Hans, *Svensk flyktingpolitik under internationellt tryck 1936–1941*, Stockholm 1973.
- London, Louise, *Whitehall and the Jews 1933–1948. British immigration policy and the Holocaust*, Cambridge 2000.
- Lundberg, Urban & Åmark, Klas, 'Social rights and social security: the Swedish welfare state, 1900–2000', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, 26 (2001).
- Lundh, Christer, 'Invandrarna i den svenska modellen – hot eller reserv? Fackligt program på 1960-talet', *Arbetshistoria*, 70 (1994).
- & Ohlsson, Rolf, *Från arbetskraftsimport till flyktinginvandring*, 2nd rev. edn., Stockholm 1999.

- *Invandringen till Sverige*, Stockholm 2010 (first pub. 2005).
- Lundmark, Lennart, *Allt som kan mätas är inte vetenskap: en populärhistorisk skrift om Rasbiologiska institutet*, Stockholm 2007.
- Magnusson, Lars, *Sveriges ekonomiska historia*, Stockholm 1996.
- Melander, Göran, *Flyktingar och asyl*, Stockholm 1972.
- Mörkenstam, Ulf, ‘Önskvärda och icke önskvärda folkelement’. Den normativa argumentationen i svensk invandringspolitik 1900–1950’, *Historisk tidskrift för Finland*, 91 (2006).
- ‘Ekonomi, kultur och jämlikhet. Teman i svensk politik i invandrarfrågor decennierna efter andra världskriget’, *Historisk tidskrift för Finland*, 95 (2010).
- Nelhans, Joachim, *Utlänningen på arbetsmarknaden. De rättsliga förutsättningarna för utlännings tillträde till den svenska arbetsmarknaden*, Lund 1973.
- Nilsson, Åke, *Efterkrigstidens invandring och utvandring*, Statistiska centralbyrån 2004, available at <www.scb.se>, accessed 8 March 2013.
- Nilsson, Torbjörn, *Hundra år av svensk politik*, Malmö 2009.
- Öberg, Nils, *Gränslös rättvisa eller rättvisa inom gränser? Om moraliska dilemman i välfärdsstaters invandrings- och invandrapolitik*, Uppsala 1994.
- O’Dell, Tom, *Culture unbound: Americanization and everyday life in Sweden*, Lund 1997.
- Olsson, Lars, ‘Hundra år av arbetskraftsinvandringen: från kapitalismens genombrott till folkhemsbygget i Sverige’, in Jan Ekberg (ed.), *Invandring till Sverige—orsaker och effekter*, Växjö 2003.
- Olsson, Lars, *On the threshold of the People’s home of Sweden. A labor perspective of Baltic refugees and relieved Polish concentration camp prisoners in Sweden at the end of World War II*, New York 1997 (first pub. in Swedish in 1995).
- Oredsson, Sverker, ‘Utländsk påverkan. Sverige mellan tyskt och amerikanskt’, in Nationalencyklopedin (ed.), *Sverige under 1900-talet*, Malmö 2000.
- Östberg, Kjell & Andersson, Jenny (eds.), *Sveriges historia 1965–2012*, Stockholm 2013.
- Persson, Sune, ‘Vi åker till Sverige’. *De vita bussarna 1945*, Rimbo 2003.
- Runcis, Maija, *Steriliseringar i folkhemmet*, Stockholm 1998.
- Sainsbury, Diane, *Welfare states and immigrant rights. The politics of inclusion and exclusion*, Oxford 2012.
- Schön, Lennart, *Sweden’s road to modernity: an economic history*, Stockholm 2010.
- Svanberg, Ingvar, ‘Migrationen. De nya svenskarna: Mellan assimilation och mångfald’, in Nationalencyklopedin (ed.), *Sverige under 1900-talet*, Malmö 2000.
- & Tydén, Mattias, *Tusen år av invandring. En svensk kulturhistoria*, 2nd rev. edn., Stockholm 2005.
- Svanberg, Johan, *Arbetets relationer och etniska dimensioner. Verkstadsföreningen, Metall och esterna vid Svenska stålpressnings AB i Olofström 1945–1952*, Växjö 2010.
- Svensson, Anders, *Ungrare i folkhemmet. Svensk flyktingpolitik i det kalla krigets skugga*, Lund 1992.
- Tempsch, Rudolf, *Från Centraleuropa till folkhemmet. Den sudettyska invandringen till Sverige 1938–1955*, Gothenburg 1997.
- Tydén, Mattias, *Från politik till praktik. De svenska steriliseringslagarna 1935–1975*, Stockholm 2002.
- Waara, Joacim, *Svenska arbetsgivarföreningen och arbetskraftsinvandringen 1945–1972*, Gothenburg 2012.

I
PERSPECTIVES ON SWEDISH
REFUGEE POLICY, 1933-45

Introduction I

Mikael Byström & Pär Frohnert

It was not until the 1970s that Swedish historians showed much interest in refugee policy. Hans Lindberg's dissertation *Svensk flyktingpolitik under internationellt tryck, 1936–1941* of 1973 was for many years the only work on the subject in Swedish. However, there were several important contributions published in German which highlighted different aspects of Swedish refugee policy and reception, among them Helmut Müssener's *Exil in Schweden: Politische und kulturelle Emigration nach Schweden* (1974), and later Hans Uwe Petersen's *Hitlerflüchtlinge im Norden: Asyl und politisches Exil 1933–1945* (1991), and Einhart Lorenz's *Ein sehr trübes Kapitel? Hitlerflüchtlinge im nordeuropäischen Exil 1933 bis 1950* (1998). Steven Koblik's *The stones cry out: Sweden's response to the persecution of the Jews 1933–1945* (1988) was not only the first academic publication to follow in Lindberg's footsteps, but also placed Swedish refugee policy firmly in a new context: the Holocaust. That the author was American was significant. Some years later the journalist Maria-Pia Boëthius challenged many of the accepted historical perspectives and conclusions concerning Sweden, the war, and neutrality by concentrating on the morality of Sweden's behaviour above all else, not least in the questions of refugee policy and the Holocaust: a corrective that did much to shift Swedish research perspectives and to formulate new questions. Thus during the 1990s a number of important publications were added to the literature on Swedish refugee policy—Anders Berge's *Flyktingpolitik i stormakts skugga* (1992), Paul Levine's *From indifference to activism: Swedish diplomacy and the Holocaust, 1938–1944* (1996) and Lars Olsson's *On the threshold of the People's Home of Sweden* (1997)—but it was not until the 2000s that the research field can be said to have been firmly established, to a large extent by authors who have contributed to this anthology.

The literature

Swedish research on refugee policy in the 1930s and 1940s can be said to have two different empirical foci. One perspective considers how legislation and machinery of government influenced the possibilities for refugees, especially Jewish refugees, to find safety in Sweden. Who was accepted, how did the process work, and what were the discourses of refugee control? The other perspective considers what happened to those refugees let into Sweden. How were they treated, what conditions did they meet, and what kind of opinions existed about the refugees? This research has usually been devoted to describing how individual groups of refugees were viewed and treated. Usually the approach has been ‘Swedish’, but some works look at things from the refugees’ perspective. In addition to these refugee studies, there is also research about Swedish antisemitism during the period in question.

The general picture given by the research on refugee policy developments is that Sweden went from a very restrictive refugee policy in the 1930s to a generous refugee policy. When exactly this change took place is much debated, and presumably the answer depends largely on the specific topic, but it usually comes down to 1942–3. The reasons given also vary, although the fact that Sweden’s foreign policy underwent a change in 1942–3 has often been emphasized. In the standard account, Sweden was able to act more freely after this point, and it has been suggested that refugee policy followed a similar pattern—specifically that Sweden’s greater scope for action enabled it to adopt a more generous refugee policy. Another common explanation stresses a change of attitudes: opinions about refugees and their needs altered, which also meant their practical reception and treatment changed, and for the better. Other explanations of the changeover, which do not exclude the previous reasons of course, include pragmatism (Sweden wanted to generate international goodwill by its generous reception of refugees), the war as such, and pressure from the Western Allies.

The research still has difficult, concrete problems to deal with. One thorny question, relevant for the essays in this anthology, is the exact number of refugees that Sweden accepted during the war. That this seemingly simple question poses such a problem is due to the fact that the official statistics comprise the number of aliens who were in the country at a certain moment, not all arrivals. Neither were registers kept of the total number of refugees or other foreign citizens who entered the country, nor on how many left the country. Many refugees, especially from Norway,